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RESEARCH ARTICLE  
 
Healing past wounds with more than an elastic bandage– 
A small scale evaluation of attitudes and aspirations of 
contemporary Northern Irish Catholics. 
                       Dr. Paul Breen, University of Westminster1  	
Arthur (1996, p. 1) suggests that literature on solutions to the 
Northern Irish “problem” could “span the entire circumference of 
the world” and yet Vaughan-Williams (2006, p. 513) points out 
that “we are still unable to define the precise problem or how it 
might be solved.” Others argue that too much emphasis has been 
placed on problematising the situation (Campbell, 1998; Vaughan-
Williams, 2006) or viewing it through a “deficit model” (McBride, 
2015, p. 253). Consistently though, there has been a growing 
awareness of the need to move beyond simple calls for “toleration, 
respect and recognition” towards actual embedding of “the 
appropriate normative expectations associated with equal 
citizenship” (ibid, p. 249). At the same time, there remains a 
certain ambiguity or lack of articulation as to the contemporary 
and long-term expectations and aspirations of Northern Irish 
nationalists. Furthermore, much of the research that exists is 
quantitative, consisting of binary questions regarding Irish unity or 
satisfaction with the constitutional status quo. On account of such 
a gap in the literature, I conducted a small-scale research study in 
early 2016 to access the voices of ordinary people within the 
nationalist community by means of a Mixed Methods approach. 
The goal was not to prioritise these voices over those of unionists 
but to find out what possible changes have occurred in terms of 
nationalist perspectives, aspirations, and sense of identity almost 
two decades since the signing of The Belfast Agreement (1998). 
The findings of the research indicate growing flexibility as regards 
perspectives on Northern Irish constitutional arrangements at the 
same time as a growing desire for a society founded on principles 
of equal respect. The argument at the heart of this paper is thus 
that such a society needs to exist for a lasting solution to take hold 
for the long term in the north of Ireland.      
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Westminster Professional Language Centre 
309 Regent Street (Room 308),  London W1B 2HW 
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Introduction and contextualisation of the situation  
 The conflict in Northern Ireland “emanates from deep-
rooted differences between the Protestant Unionist community, 
which seeks to remain part of the United Kingdom, and the 
Catholic Nationalist community, which seeks the unification of an 
Irish republic” (Church et al, 2004, p. 273). The problem though is 
not one of religious division in itself, but the fact that “religious 
ascription has typically been seen as coterminous with national 
identity” (Nagle, 2012, p. 3). This has been evident in voting 
patterns since the very creation of the state, right up to the present 
time, where the Northern Ireland Assembly election of March 2017 
appears to have reinforced “headcountery” (Hughes, 2013), with 
effective deadlock in terms of seats held by the two main factions.  
Donnelly (2017) refers to this as nationalism biting back to 
an effective 44% of the seats on offer, having fallen to “a meagre 
36%” of the votes in the previous election. Consequently, debate on 
the issue of a united Ireland has arisen once again as exemplified 
by the works of Meagher (2016) although Whiting (2017) contends 
that this election was more about “bedding down better 
functioning Northern Irish institutions than moving closer to All-
Ireland ones” (p. 2). He also highlights the impact of the DUP 
suffering as a consequence of being “the only major party to back 
Brexit in a territory that voted 56% to remain” and also holding 
views in contrast to “the strikingly secular and modern feel” of 
today’s society (ibid). Yet, in spite of this growing sense of 
modernity, Northern Irish identities largely remain “construed on 
the British versus Irish faultline” (Tonge & Gomez, 2015, p. 1).  
Although Northern Ireland only came into existence as a 
jurisdiction following the “partition of Ireland” (O’Neill, 2003, p. 
380), divisions have occurred on the island for centuries. These 
existed in localised feudal form even before Britain’s colonisation, 
and consolidation of this through plantations of the 17th century. 
Historical events of the late 19th and early 20th centuries increased 
Ulster’s sense of separatism, and eventually led to the creation of 
Northern Ireland as a de facto Protestant state for Protestant 
people. Problematically though, even at the birth of this state, one 
third of the population identified as Catholic and Irish. Thus, the 
early decades of this new entity came to be characterised by 
discrimination against Catholics (Meagher, 2016a), causing their 
subsequent “political alienation” (O’Neill, 2003, p. 380) that some 
nationalists regard as sparking the conflict of the late 1960s. 
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Conflict raged for approximately one quarter of a century, 
before moves towards peace began in the early 1990s, leading to 
the Belfast Agreement signed on Good Friday, April 10th 1998 after 
two years of formal negotiations between representatives of 
unionism and nationalism. Brown & Macginty (2003, p. 85) 
describe this as being the end of “a lengthy, and often precarious, 
peace process”, which formally recognised that Northern Ireland is 
a society with “deeply entrenched segregation” (O’Neill, 2003, p. 
374); composed of “two historically antagonistic national 
communities” (ibid, p. 375). However, this agreement established 
“provisions for a new political and constitutional configuration in 
Northern Ireland, on the island of Ireland and between Ireland and 
Britain”, and cemented “a strong equalisation policy” that had 
been blossoming since the late nineteen eighties (Todd, 2010, p. 2). 
Nagle (2012, p.12) further describes the deal as recognizing both 
nationalists and unionists’ respective “self-determination claims, 
the need to share political power, as well as ‘parity of esteem’ for 
their cultural identities.” This means that even though the society 
is still “riven by deep divisions” it has “the appropriate legal 
mechanisms” in place for a settlement (McBride, 2015, p. 249).  
McBride (2015, p. 253) draws on the work of Walzer (1997, 
pp. 10-11) in discussing a continuum of societal development that 
moves from “resigned acceptance of difference for the sake of 
peace” through three further stages up to the point of a more 
meaningful “enthusiastic endorsement of difference.” For such 
differences to be fully recognised, he argues that the nationalist 
identity needs to be included in “mainstream assumptions about 
what counts as normal” within the society (2015, p. 254). This is a 
view further supported by Morrow (2015, p. 212) who uses the 
example of the Orange Order to exemplify how the state, and 
perhaps the media to a considerable extent, give “institutional 
expression to a visible Protestant community.” This is done 
through acceptance of their main marching day, 12th of July, as a 
public holiday and the ways in which, largely in the past, the 
security apparatus of the state was used to manage, and even 
enforce this sense of an ‘Orange’ hegemony over the society.    
One means of giving institutional expression to nationalists 
would be the “joint British-Irish sovereignty” referred to by O’Neill 
(2003. p. 369), which would be anathema to many Ulster loyalists. 
However, this could also safeguard unionist interests in the long 
run because present arrangements appear to leave “both groups 
vulnerable to the contingency of demographics” (ibid, p. 383). 
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Indeed, according to Little (2003), cited in Vaughan-Williams 
(2006, p. 516) the 1998 Belfast Agreement is more like “a 
temporary elastic bandage over a deep wound than permanent 
multi-level suturing.” Essentially, the 1998 Agreement was 
predicated upon a need to “minimize political violence” and “to 
prioritize the politics of national conflict over other struggles” 
(O’Neill, 2003, p. 387).  The consequences of the latter are that 
within the Northern Ireland Assembly, parties can only be given 
the labels nationalist, unionist, or other; effectively crystallising the 
“monochrome notions of identity” referred to in Vaughan-Williams 
(2006, p. 518). Thus when the anti-austerity People Before Profit 
Alliance made an unexpected electoral breakthrough in the 2016 
Northern Ireland Assembly election with the claim of being 
“neither Orange or Green” there was no legal provision for them to 
identify as ‘socialist’ (Socialist Worker, 2016).  The framework, as 
it stands, seems unable to take on board “overlapping, confused, or 
even contradictory identities” which “slice through the alleged fault 
lines of conflict” (Vaughan-Williams, 2006, p. 518).  
O’Neill (2003) has further argued that one approach to 
addressing issues of “opposing political aspirations, differing 
identities, and diverging loyalties” (p. 380) is to draw upon the 
work of John Rawls (1987) in advocating an ‘overlapping 
consensus.’ This is an arrangement where differing groups focus 
on dialogue as a means of establishing particular principles of 
justice that establish the foundations for a fair society, in which the 
rules of governance do not favour the interests of any single group 
over another (ibid).  However, more contemporary thought seems 
to favour action over further dialogue and movement beyond 
toleration towards reaching “the sharp edges” of both communities 
recognising other cultural identities within Northern Ireland 
(McBride, 2015, p. 253). Morrow (2015, p. 211) even suggests that 
“the main political parties have moved away from reconciliation”, 
which has created a vacuum of distrust and de facto stalemate, that 
necessitates “alternative approaches to pluralism.” A critical first 
step in that is placating loyalist fears of the equality agenda simply 
being “a Trojan horse” (ibid, p. 213 & Neill, 2017) designed to 
“hollow out” the Union as Todd (2015, p. 4) highlights when 
discussing loyalist street protests in winter 2012 relating to the 
flying of the Union flag from Belfast City Hall (ibid, p. 2). Yet, it is 
perhaps not the visible erosion of their cultural symbols that offers 
the greatest existential threat to Ulster Unionism. It is the 1998 
Agreement’s scope for the contingency of demographics, as 
referred to in O’Neill (2003) and Sommers (2014).         
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Going beyond demographics to new areas of consensus 
The 1998 Belfast Agreement was established to end military 
conflict, as much as addressing the underlying political conflict. 
Thus, the agreement leaves scope for both the unification of 
Ireland, in the long term, and the solidification of Northern 
Ireland’s place within the United Kingdom. Indeed, the opening 
line of the section on Northern Ireland’s constitutional future 
states that both governments, Irish and British, “recognise the 
legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of 
the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status” (1998, p. 
3). Ruane and Todd (2001, p. 923) therefore label the document as 
echoing and reconstituting the “political terrain” in contradiction 
and ambiguity. Others could argue that this has created a more 
positive, open-ended, and pluralistic political terrain than before.   
Yet, an inherent problem of the 1998 Agreement is that it can 
inadvertently give the impression of nationalists simply having to 
bide their time until they become a majority, call for a border poll, 
and emerge victorious in a winner-takes-all situation. One likely 
consequence of Sinn Fein’s success in the 2017 Northern Ireland 
Assembly elections is that such a call will now be made (Donnelly, 
2017), particularly in light of developments surrounding Britain’s 
departure from the European Union and subsequent demands for 
a second Independence Referendum in Scotland.  
 
Hughes (2013) highlights the possible future role of 
demographics by suggesting that “the trend is for a growing 
catholic population while the protestant population is in decline 
and ageing” and that Northern Ireland has one of the youngest 
populations in Europe, and in every five year age group under 25 
catholics are well over 50 per cent.” Currently, the population of 
Northern Ireland is approximately 1.8 million people according to 
the Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency website (2013), 
and has a Catholic population of around 40-45% (ibid). The key 
point of significance here is that this figure has risen substantially 
from the time of the 1921 partition when the Protestant population 
had close to a two to one majority. Prior to 1997, particularly in 
General Elections, the combined nationalist and republican vote 
had been in the region of 31 to 34% (Donnelly, 2015), but rose 
sharply with the advent of the peace process, suggesting that in a 
time of violence and political uncertainty, Catholics in Northern 
Ireland were not going to the polls.  
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Though it is unlikely that a majority of people in Northern 
Ireland would vote for an end to partition, there is a growing sense 
in the media that younger nationalist voters have been 
“radicalised” by the Unionist parties’ failure to push forward the 
equality agenda (Cahill, 2017). Radicalisation has also been shaped 
by issues such as the 2012 Belfast flag protests (Hughes, 2013), 
political scandals involving the DUP (Whiting, 2017, p. 2) and by 
the fear that Brexit might “roll back the GFA” as predicted in Todd 
(2015). The Brexit issue may have particularly contributed to the 
voting surge in support of Sinn Fein, as a pro-EU party, in March 
2017, though it does not necessarily mean that new voters see 
concerns over “austerity, Brexit, and civil rights best protected 
within a united Ireland framework” (Whiting, 2017, p. 3). 
However, Meagher (2016c) has argued that Sinn Fein’s “age-old 
bid for Irish re-unification now comes wearing neutral, utilitarian 
colours, responding to a genuine, contemporary issue.”  
This new argument for instigating a discussion on Irish 
unification has been given further support by such research as the 
Modelling Irish Unification economic study conducted by Kurt 
Hübner and Renger Van Nieuwkoop (2015) in which three 
unification scenarios were examined in detail. This was done 
through a series of “simulations generated from a ‘computable 
general equilibrium’ (CGE) model of the economies of Northern 
Ireland and the ROI”  (vii) that highlighted areas of potential 
benefit as being “harmonization of the tax systems across the 
Island, with the North adopting the tax rates and regulations of the 
south”; “diminished trade barriers and greater access of Northern 
Irish firms to the common market”; and “adoption of the Euro in 
the North” (viii). The latter two suggestions, made prior to the 
United Kingdom European Union membership referendum of 
2016, have now taken on much greater significance in light of 
Britain’s intention to withdraw from the grouping. Suddenly, 
economic arguments that could have previously been dismissed as 
idealistic are now grounded in political realities (Meagher, 2016a).  
Thus, some would argue that for the first time in decades Irish 
unification is no longer contingent upon demographics alone, but 
rather a means of offering the best outcome for Northern Ireland’s 
future (Meagher, 2016b) that is increasingly being framed in 
consideration of future possibilities within an All-Ireland context 
(Emerson, 2016). Prior to this, some of the literature labelled the 
desire for Irish unity to be based on “utopian ideals” (Aughey, 
2005)  or what Hassan (2002, p. 68) terms a “romantic desire for a 
united Ireland”, as also voiced in Mitchel et al (2009).  
	 7	
Possible future repositioning of voting patterns 
Various press surveys carried out over the past decade have 
suggested that Catholics are increasingly content with the 
constitutional status quo (Clarke, 2012), and this is further 
supported by research conducted through The Northern Ireland 
Life and Times Survey (2010a/2010b). This survey organised 
jointly by Queens University and The University of Ulster since 
1998 is a means of recording “the attitudes, values and beliefs of 
the people in Northern Ireland on a wide range of social policy 
issues” (2015). More contemporary surveys of this nature have 
included a 2016 Ipsos Mori Border Referendum Poll and a Lucid 
Talk Poll of May 2017 in which each of these substantiated the view 
that Irish unity is not an immediate priority for all nationalists.  
Despite the results of the 2017 Assembly Election, voting 
patterns over the past decade have suggested societal transition 
within Northern Ireland, and a shift towards parties not simply 
defined by constitutional alignments. Nagle (2012, p. 1), for 
example, has argued that through the current power sharing 
arrangements we are seeing “the repositioning of Irish nationalism 
from a secessionist movement to a substate nationalism mobilizing 
for more resources within the framework of devolution.” He goes 
on to add (ibid, p. 7) that “Irish nationalists, while voting for 
parties who they believe will act as strong defenders of their ethnic 
interests in the public sphere against unionists, are relatively 
content with the constitutional status quo (Mitchell et al 2009, p. 
402).” Todd (2010, p. 7) further supports this by suggesting that 
the “tenor” of Northern Irish politics is changing; that its citizens 
are learning to live with the possible implementation of alternative 
constitutional settlements; and it “is no longer possible to read 
ethnic self-conceptions, national identifications and political 
perspectives from political ‘bloc’ voting, nor is that voting in any 
simple sense expressive of ‘identity-politics’.” 
 
Within both the academic and popular literature, there had 
been a growing sense of optimism for the creation of a new social 
and political space in which identities are not constructed with 
such binary rigidity. This though has been challenged to some 
extent by developments around the 2017 Assembly elections in 
which Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams asserted that the actions 
of Arlene Foster, Democratic Unionist Party leader, in denigrating 
nationalist aspirations regarding equality of culture, language and 
symbols, had “radicalised” Sinn Fein’s vote (Cahill, 2017). Some 
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commentators are even suggesting that the two mainstream 
Unionist parties may retreat into a single alliance that relies 
entirely upon sectarian “headcountery” (Hughes, 2013) to preserve 
the constitutional status quo. That though, on the basis of the 
survey described herein, would be a mistake because “the fault 
lines of conflict” (Vaughan-Williams, 2006, p. 518) are not as clear 
cut as in the days before the Belfast Agreement of 1998.  
Research study and methodology     
The study came about as a result of wanting to address a 
perceived gap in the literature on Northern Ireland. This 
concerned the limited amount of investigations into the political 
attitudes of the growing Catholic population and their sense of 
identity (ies) two decades after the Belfast Agreement. This had to 
be a small scale study, for pragmatic and epistemological reasons. 
Firstly, although born in Northern Ireland, I am based in London. 
Secondly, in line with principles of qualitative research, the goal 
was to attain depth of responses rather than breadth, in presenting 
a “plurality of interests, voices, and perspectives” (Greene & 
Caracelli, 1997, p.14) from within the nationalist community. By 
“reporting multiple perspectives” in a detailed way I hoped to 
sketch “the larger picture that emerges” (Creswell, 2009, p. 176) 
and make sense of nationalist attitudes and aspirations.  
To do this, I firstly designed a survey as a means of collecting 
both qualitative and quantitative data to help understand the 
intended phenomena under investigation. In designing the survey, 
I was aware of a challenging balancing act of asking enough 
questions to get meaningful responses, whilst not asking so many 
as to deter possible respondents from taking part. Thus I opted for 
eight questions, alongside basic demographic information on age, 
location, and professional status. The reason for the latter two was 
to establish if and how attitudes differ according to variables of 
geographic position within Northern Ireland, and what we can 
loosely term social class. This was deemed important because 
historically, working class Catholics have voted for Sinn Fein whilst 
the middle classes have cast their ballots for the Social Democratic 
and Labour Party (SDLP), or the Alliance Party. Thus the 
questions, excluding demographic information, were expressed as 
follows; in a way that lends itself to generation of data that is both 




Actual questions used in the survey  
 
1. Which of these terms best describes your political views?      
 
a. Nationalist (likely to vote SDLP) 
b. Republican (likely to vote Sinn Fein) 
c. Unionist (likely to vote for a pro-British party)  
d. Other (please specify) 
 
2. What are your main reasons for holding these political views? 
Give three if possible.  
 
3. Do you think there will ever be a united Ireland? 
 
a. Yes, within my own lifetime.       
b. Yes, but not within my own lifetime.  
c. No, there will never be a united Ireland.  
d. Other (please specify).  
 
4. If there were a referendum for a united Ireland tomorrow, how 
would you vote?  
 
a. Yes, I would want a united Ireland. 
b. No, I would not want a united Ireland.  
c. I would be undecided.  
d. Other (please specify).  
 
5. What are your main reasons for your voting decision in the 
previous question (4)?  
 
6. Are you happy living in Northern Ireland as it is now; part of the 
UK with power sharing between Catholics and Protestants?  
 
a. Yes, I am happy with this and would be content with no change.  
b. Yes, I am happy with this but would like to see a united Ireland 
at some stage.  
c. No, I am not happy with the present arrangements.  
d. Other (please specify).  
 
7. If you answered yes to the previous question, what are the main 
reasons for your contentment with the state of Northern Ireland as 
it is now?  
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8. If you are not happy with Northern Ireland as it is now, what 
could Unionist parties or the British government do to persuade 
you to be happy with Northern Ireland as a permanent part of the 
United Kingdom?  
 
Sample, survey distribution, and analysis  
 
Having designed the research instrument the next issues for 
resolution concerned dissemination of survey and choice of 
sample. I drew on the work of Patton (1990) in choosing potential 
participants fitted to the study’s “theoretical apparatus” 
(Silverman, 2005, p. 130). Since I needed responses from the 
Northern Irish nationalist community, it was best to select a 
“small, homogenous sample” (Patton, 1990, p. 173) where 
“participants are included in a study on the basis of their ability, as 
judged by the researcher, to provide information relevant to the 
central purposes of the research” (Borg, 2006, p. 9). Therefore, I 
administered the questions on the online platform SurveyMonkey, 
which was accessible via a link sent out to two hundred people, 
purposefully selected from across a range of organisations and 
social media sites, carefully balancing the selections according to 
age, geography, gender, interests, and perceived social status.  
 
As practical examples of this, I sent the survey to young 
people of a similar age in schools and universities in different parts 
of Northern Ireland, whilst also contacting groups within which an 
older, more conservative demographic usually participates, such as 
church organisations. In sending out the link, I also suggested that 
people could forward it on to others so long as they were of a 
Northern Irish ‘nationalist’ background, but this tended to happen 
only in very few cases. Thus, it may have been better to send print 
versions of the survey, in some cases, or to share the link more 
publicly, but the latter could have lent itself to bias in the event of 
people, outside the intended demographic, completing the task.  
 
In the end, I had a response rate of 77 people, which is 
approximately 38.5% of the original sample that had directly 
received the SurveyMonkey link. Since the research study was 
qualitative, and the data evaluated by a process of thematic 
analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), this was not such a major issue as 
it might have been in research that was purely statistical. The goal 
of a qualitative study is to attain trustworthiness, and convince an 
audience that the findings are worth paying attention to. In this 
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case, themes that emerged achieved Teddlie & Tashakkori’s four 
criteria for trustworthiness (2009, p. 212). Labelled as “credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability” these could be 
measured by examining the responses in light of both theory, from 
the literature, and voting practices in the 2016 and 2017 elections. 
However, it is still important to stress that this should be seen 
primarily as a small-scale pilot study where the qualitative aspects 
of the study make the greatest contribution to knowledge.  
 
Overview of initial findings within the study  
 
Fundamentally, this study provided a glimpse into the 
perspective of a small group of (Northern) Irish nationalists whose 
attitudes reflect to some extent broader views and values of those 
within their community, as borne out by recent political 
developments. Responses were characterised by frustration at the 
political impasse of the time (early 2016), combined with a desire 
for equal citizenship within society, which would ultimately 
manifest itself in voting patterns at the 2017 Assembly Election. 
However, responses also suggested that today’s nationalist voters 
have a myriad of reasons for their choices, and there are a range of 
variables that go beyond demographics and traditional voting 
patterns. Ultimately, there appears to be a demand for nationalism 
to be fully accepted into the mainstream of society, echoing 
McBride (2015) in his call for “a society founded on equal respect” 
that is not just evident in governmental mechanisms but also 
apparent in everyday lives and expectations (p. 264).    
 
One salient point to emerge from this study is that it appears 
Catholics may vote for nationalist or republican parties in 
elections, but would not necessarily vote to unite Ireland, and 
abandon the British state, in an official referendum. This seems to 
tie in with the findings expressed in surveys described by Clarke 
(2012) and also The Northern Ireland Life and Times Surveys 
(2010a/2010b). However, where this survey differs from those is 
that here I have left scope for further qualitative analysis of why 
people are choosing particular answers rather than relying on 
statistics alone, which do not always allow researchers to sketch 
full details of the picture that has emerged from the responses. Yet, 
in the first instance, the statistics shown below provide an 
interesting glimpse of possible contradictions and very definite 
complexities as regards contemporary nationalist aspirations. 
There is a clear contrast between Figure One, which shows 
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‘political views’, and Figure Two’s ‘attitudes to voting intentions in 
an immediate referendum on Irish unity.’  
 
 
   
Roughly in line with Catholic/nationalist voting patterns of 
recent elections the percentage of those likely to vote Sinn Fein was 
much greater than those likely to vote SDLP. The surprising 
element is that less than 2% of voters would vote for a Unionist 
party despite seeming contentment with the constitutional status 
quo, and of the 13% who identify as ‘Other’, 40% claim to not cast 
their vote in elections. The remaining 60% of this category mainly 
vote Alliance, with one suggestion of the Green Party, and one 
suggestion of not voting “purely on party affiliation”, but “for 
people I know will work for the benefit of the community.” The 
latter emphasis on community echoed a response by an SDLP 
voter who suggested voting for the party because on a local level, 
Sinn Fein members seemed “more interested in photo 
opportunities than dealing with actual problems in the county.” 
 
Such an emphasis on more pragmatic politics could be taken 
as a sign of the society moving on from entrenched positions where 
the national question is the be-all and end-all. This is further 
supported by the fact that even though roughly 85% of Northern 
Irish Catholics vote for nationalist or republican parties only 
48.8% of those surveyed said that they would vote for a united 
Ireland in a referendum ‘tomorrow.’  The results of this question 
can be seen in Figure Two, but statistics alone do not paint the full 
picture. Although the majority of those who would vote for a united 
Ireland ‘tomorrow’ are Sinn Fein voters, this figure includes a 
minority of SDLP voters and one person who traditionally votes 
     FIGURE ONE – Political views of the research sample  
LIKELY VOTING OPTION PERCENTAGE OF SAMPLE  
Nationalist (likely to vote SDLP)  29.5% 
Republican (likely to vote Sinn Fein)  
 
54.9%  
Unionist (likely to vote for a pro-
British party)  
 
1.9% 
Other (please specify)  13.7% 
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Alliance. This means firstly that not all Sinn Fein voters see a 
united Ireland as possible or practical in the short term, whilst 
others appear to be opening up to this possibility or option within 




The figure of 48% is certainly very different to the 85% of 
those who vote for parties that are traditionally seen as being 
strongly in favour of Irish unification. Of course this is not so 
different to the findings of surveys conducted through the media 
within Northern Ireland, but the difference here is that a further 
question was asked about contentment with the state as it is. Here, 
22.5% of respondents suggest that they are happy with the present 
arrangements and would like no change, whilst roughly 51% are 
happy but would like to see a united Ireland at some stage. 16.3% 
are not happy with the present arrangements and 10% have other 
opinions, or are ambivalent. This seems to suggest that around 
80% of Northern Irish nationalists, whilst not entirely happy with 
the present situation, are open to the possibility of their concerns 
being resolved within the current constitutional arrangements.  
 
Answers to a further question on unification again suggest 
moves towards a greater sense of compromise and pragmatism, as 
seen in Figure Three. It is also important to consider the 
correlation between parties that respondents claim to vote for and 
responses to this question because the split on who expects to see a 
united Ireland in their lifetime reveals that Sinn Fein supporters 
have a similar expectation about this to their SDLP counterparts.     
 
FIGURE TWO – Attitudes to voting intentions in an 
immediate referendum on Irish unity   
 
LIKELY VOTING OPTION PERCENTAGE OF SAMPLE  
 
Yes, I would want a united 
Ireland.  
48.08% 




I would be undecided.  34.62% 




On the whole, the statistics suggest that Northern Irish 
nationalists’ political beliefs are no longer as straightforward as 
they once were, though the majority still vote along religious and 
ethnic fault lines. The statistics also challenge those, mainly in the 
liberal unionist media, who believe that Catholics can be 
persuaded to vote for pro-Union parties. In fact statistics reveal a 
greater drift towards ambivalence than the likelihood of voting 
Unionist. Yet, in a situation of such complexity, it is impossible to 
get a grasp of the full picture on the basis of statistics alone. 
Therefore, in order to get a sense of possible or pragmatic shifts in 
the Northern Irish nationalist mindset, it is important to now focus 
on more qualitative aspects of the study and give expression to the 
data through the authentic voices of the research participants.      
  
Findings from qualitative aspects of the study 
 
It is clear from the literature that the Catholic population of 
Northern Ireland has risen steadily though less clear as to whether 
or not they feel that this can be equated with a growing stake and 
equal voice in their society (Hassan, 2002; Nolan, 2012; Breen, 
2013). Though some academics have focused on the future impact 
of this demographic change, there have been few studies that have 
sought to assess the likely implications of this in terms of 
aspiration, ideology, and political pragmatism. Most surveys 
conducted with regards to nationalist attitudes and aspirations 
tend to be quantitative in nature, and disseminated via the media. 
Thus, even though they attract a much wider range of responses, 
the end results are largely numerical. One of the strengths of this 
study and qualitative research in general is that even though 
responses are fewer in number, they have greater depth on account 
FIGURE THREE – Views of respondents on whether or not 
there will ever be a united Ireland.   
OPTION TO CHOOSE FROM PERCENTAGE OF SAMPLE 
Yes, within my own lifetime  11.76% 
Yes, but not within my own 
lifetime  
47.06%  
No, there will never be a united 
Ireland  
35.29%  
Other (please specify)   5.88%  
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of being accompanied by deeper responses than simply those 
binary or sliding-scale choices that feature in statistical surveys.  
 
This survey therefore left scope for respondents to offer 
views or opinions alongside their more quantitative responses. 
That can be seen in practical terms with questions one and two, for 
example, where firstly respondents are asked to choose the party 
that best represents their political affiliation, and then to give up to 
three main reasons for holding those views. Through taking this 
qualitative approach I have gained responses that both support 
and challenge existing ideas about Irish nationalism, including the 
issues that influence people’s voting patterns and broader political 
affiliations and concerns. From this I have been able to decipher 
that nationalism can no longer be reduced to straightforward 
communal positions around the constitutional question. Indeed, 
for the majority of respondents issues that impact on their daily 
lives, as suggested in McBride (2015) and Whiting (2017), appear 
to be greater priorities. The latter sentiment was strongly voiced by 
one respondent, designating as ‘other/Labour2’ who suggested that 
“the economy and society in Northern Ireland needs proper 
politics about the real issues affecting day to day lives.”  
Interestingly, the only respondent who identified as 
‘Other/Conservative’ echoed this interest in social issues by 
asserting that none of the Northern Irish parties will “rise above 
tribal politics” and  “tackle the ‘Nanny State’ or bring any kind of 
quality to the political debate here or elsewhere.”  
 
Even Sinn Fein and SDLP voters observed a lack of focus in 
dealing with social issues, with supporters of the latter blaming the 
former party for not addressing everyday issues and problems. 
Others advocated a move away from the politics of the past and a 
culture of blame, with one rural voter going so far as suggesting 
that their vote was now flexible, and dependent upon responses to 
social issues “rather than party affiliation.” Another suggested 
voting for parties that would protect their rural county from “the 
threat of fracking” which suggests potential affilitation to parties 
such as the Greens and Independents who designate as ‘other.’  
This desire for movement away from a culture of blame also 
suggests a shift away from the “factory of grievances” narrative 
suggested by Buckland (1979), cited in Morrow (2015, p. 211), 
towards Walzer’s (1997) idea of progression towards “principled 																																																								2	This was on the proviso that they might one day stand in Northern Irish 
elections – though not clarified if that were Irish or British Labour.		
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recognition that the others have rights” as a crucial step on the way 
to eventual “enthusiastic endorsement of difference.” It also 
appears to reflect Tonge’s (2014, p. 17) assertion that there is a 
growing “cognisance amongst nationalists of the seeming 
impossibility of imposing Irish unity upon reluctant unionists 
without consent in Northern Ireland.” Perhaps there is a 
realisation too that the best avenue for such consent is to work 
together with unionists on issues that really matter in people’s 
everyday lives such as the environment and the economy.  
 
Although this brief snapshot of attitude and aspiration is 
only part of the broader response, the “tenor” of Northern Ireland’s 
politics appears to be changing (Todd, 2010, p. 7). However, this is 
not necessarily leading to changes in voting patterns based on 
identity politics. The majority of respondents still claim to vote for 
one of the two main parties on the nationalist/republican side, but 
do not appear to see a pressing need for Irish unity. Indeed, as 
Hassan (2002, p. 68) suggests, the emphasis is shifting away from 
straightforward reunification to the pursuit of equality within 
Northern Ireland. Several of the respondents voiced a need for 
“parity of esteem” (Nagle, 2012), and “equal citizenship” (O’Neill, 
2000), in sentiment rather than precise usage of those terms.    
 
Problematically, there is a recurring doubt about the capacity 
of the Unionist parties to actually engage with nationalists in an 
equal partnership. Those parties thus are not seen as meeting their 
end of the bargain in terms of creating the conditions for an 
“overlapping consensus” (O’Neill, 2003) of power-sharing. There is 
a sense that they want to dictate rather than negotiate terms, and 
that they struggle to understand the concept of “equal citizenship” 
as discussed in O’Neill’s (2000) work on the issue of parades. 
However, from the perspective of these respondents, there has to 
be consensus if Irish unity is ever to occur. Two respondents said 
that there would be no point in having a disgruntled minority in a 
united Ireland, or it would leave things just the same as before. 
Regardless of party affiliation, most respondents seem more 
content with the certainities of Northern Ireland than the step into 
the unknown that a united Ireland would bring to their everyday 
lives. The problem, as voiced by one respondent, a Sinn Fein voter, 
is that many nationalists see reunification as the only way in which 
they will ever be able to gain any meaningful equality.   
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Another respondent, an SDLP voter in his forties, says “it is 
good to see power sharing working” but adds “I sometimes doubt 
Unionist parties would be interested if they were the second largest 
party in government.” A female Sinn Fein voter in her thirties 
describes Unionist parties as “living in the past” whilst this is again 
echoed by an SDLP voter in her fifties who suggests that they need 
“to move on from the past.” The term “sectarian” appears several 
times, with one instance coming from a respondent who votes 
‘Other’ although is in favour of a unified Ireland for “social, 
economic and cultural” reasons. He suggests that he would like to 
see Unionist parties or the British government “repeal sectarian 
legislation like the Act of Settlement” in order to create better 
conditions for Catholics living in Northern Ireland. Further to this, 
a male Sinn Fein voter in his late thirties describes Unionist 
political actions as being “sectarian”. Echoes of this are again 
found in the response from another male Sinn Fein voter who says 
“unionism needs to cast adrift its 'zero-sum', bigoted mentality 
before it can even think about attracting Catholic voters.” 
 
However, it is important to stress that not every respondent 
was so damning of the Unionist parties. The majority appear to be 
ambivalent towards unionism, whilst an Alliance voter in his 
forties lumps all major political groupings together in the assertion 
of being “sick of the traditional parties and their jaded views”, 
which are impeding progress on such issues as “the provision of 
NHS here.” A voter in the ‘Other’ category echoes this with the 
statement that “the party system hampers political progress” and 
there is “an obligation to leave behind old prejudicial politics so 
that we can create a more socially progressive State.” This 
respondent, who provides no demographic information other than 
location, further asserts that there is “a growing awareness of the 
harm past ideologies inflicted upon powerless people from all 
communities who were used as voting fodder.”  
 
Interestingly, the solitary respondent who claims to vote for 
an unspecified Unionist party also voices frustration with the 
current choices on offer to the Northern Irish electorate. This 
voter, in their twenties, believes that “the country is at detriment 
being 'run' by the current situation” and that there “is too much 
politics within politics, meaning that if the MLA's and Ministers 
political agendas and beliefs were removed and their sole focus on 
making Northern Ireland a sustainable economic prosperous 
country then NI would be a good place to live.” There is also a 
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sense of Sinn Fein in 2016 contributing in some part to the apathy 
because of “focusing on slogans” rather than solutions, to quote 
one voter amongst several, whose words echo suggestions in the 
literature regarding parties on both sides of the constitutional 
divide who have adopted a stance whereby pragmatic choices in 
everyday politics differ radically from public pronouncements. 
Mitchell et al (2009, p. 12) refer to this type of organisation as a 
“tribune party” which they define as one that combines “robust 
ethnic identity mobilization with increased pragmatism over 
political resource allocations.” 
 
A shift towards foundations for equal citizenship   
 
 One of the most significant findings of this study is that it 
now appears as if most Irish nationalists can accept existing 
constitutional arrangements so long as these grant them a sense of 
what they see as equality.  At the same time many still aspire to a 
united Ireland, and appear to see no contradiction in acceptance of 
both Northern Ireland as it is and the unified island they would 
like to see. The variation of responses connected to an acceptance 
of more flexible and open-minded constitutional arrangements 
supports the idea that there has been a gradual sea change in 
expectations of nationalists within Northern Ireland (Nagel, 2012; 
Fissuh et al, 2012). However, several of the respondents did not see 
this being reciprocated on the unionist side, as regards parity for 
the Irish language and equality of each side’s national symbols. 
Several respondents voiced the belief that unionists cannot 
countenance the notion of equality in areas of symbols and 
language, and some Sinn Fein voters suggested that such equality 
would only ultimately be found in an All-Ireland context.  
Yet, a further point of interest is that at the time of the study, 
the demand for movement towards a united Ireland no longer 
seemed to be as pressing an issue as creating conditions of equality 
within contemporary Northern Irish society. This emphasis on 
creating conditions of equality was mainly stressed by Sinn Fein 
and SDLP supporters although even those who designated as 
‘Others’ and ‘Alliance’ voters voiced a need for change. 
Furthermore, lines of demarcation between traditional Sinn Fein 
and SDLP attitudes appear to have blurred to the extent that some 
SDLP voters are more enthusiastic about the prospect of a united 
Ireland than their Sinn Fein counterparts. At the same time, some 
other SDLP voters are happy not so much with the status quo as it 
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is, but with the prospect of meaningful power sharing in the 
medium term. This again suggests a blurring of traditional 
boundaries not just communally, but also individual affiliations.  
This supports Hassan’s (2002) claim of Northern Irish 
‘nationalism’ evolving into a more “complex, internally 
differentiated ideology, based on an interrelated core of concepts 
that cut across and qualify each other”  (p. 68). It now appears 
possible, for example, to be an Alliance voter and have an 
aspiration for a united Ireland, and to not see this party as being 
unionist or pro-British, but as a genuine neutral alternative 
prepared to position itself within the framework of what is best for 
Northern Ireland. Sinn Fein voters too appear to be prepared to 
put Northern Irish interests first, even if that northern may still be 
spelt out with a small ‘n’ in many cases. There are Sinn Fein voters 
in the study who do not believe there will ever be a united Ireland, 
even though they may aspire to one, and that they consequently 
have to make Northern Ireland work for the sake of “peace” - a 
recurring quote and paraphrase. Though this may have been 
known for some time, and is effectively Sinn Fein’s unofficial 
policy, it is quite unusual to have that voiced so openly by the 
party’s supporters, even when having anonymity.  
 
That suggests a growing confidence on the part of Sinn Fein 
supporters that the peace process is working and they are seeing 
positive results from it even though true parity of esteem has not 
yet emerged. This also supports Nagle’s (2012) argument that Irish 
nationalism is moving away from being “a secessionist movement” 
to a “substate nationalism mobilizing for more resources within 
the framework of devolution” (p. 1). Furthermore, as Mitchell et al 
(2009, p. 402) have suggested, the nationalist parties themselves 
are increasingly content with “the constitutional status quo” even 
if, in the voice of one respondent, the present arrangements are “a 
stepping stone.” That respondent, a Sinn Fein voter in his forties, 
may appear to echo the fear of many unionists that some 
nationalists see this present process as a “generational truce” 
rather than “a permanent peace” (Nolan, 2012, p. 3). However, 
closer analysis of his responses shows that the “stepping stone” is 
not actually a united Ireland but a shift towards greater equality 
within Northern Ireland, regardless of the constitutional context 
that occurs in, for now. Even in the aftermath of the UK’s EU 
referendum result there might still be more of a demand for an 
internal settlement that guarantees an equal stake in a just society, 
than for arrangements framed in an All-Ireland context.  
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Overall findings and recommendations 
 
Though this study was relatively small scale, it has provided a 
unique and interesting glimpse into the mindset of contemporary 
Northern Irish Catholics. The vast majority of respondents in the 
study were between the ages of 25 and 54, with fewer responses 
from those under the age of 24, and those from 55 upwards. 
Though the latter was anticipated to a greater extent on account of 
the survey being collected online, the lack of engagement from 
younger respondents does point to a limitation, but can also be 
explained by the apathy that was evident in 2016, and then 
energised, even “radicalised” in 2017 (Cahill, 2017). Despite this, 
there appears to be contentment with the constitutional status quo, 
so long as equality of citizenship and aspiration is offered.  
 
The problem is that even twenty years after the signing of the 
Belfast Agreement, Northern Irish society has never quite reached 
the level of suturing its deep communal wounds. Nationalists still 
feel that their self-determination claims and their symbols are not 
treated with equal reverence, whilst “parity of esteem for cultural 
identities” (Nagle, 2012, p. 12) has not been attained. Though 
political power may be shared, many nationalists detect no 
meaningful sense of what O’Neill (2000) describes as “equal 
citizenship.” For that to happen, each side needs to find a means of 
tolerating, if not quite accepting, the aspirations of the other. This 
does not, of course, mean that all the onus is on the unionist side, 
because nationalists need to a find a way of articulating their 
Irishness that is not bound up in any constitutional pre-conditions.   
 
This study then has been useful in giving people from the 
nationalist community a forum for expressing their opinions. 
Though drawn from a relatively small sample, that has provided a 
striking glimpse into contemporary attitudes and aspirations. 
Furthermore the study helps to explain events surrounding the 
Assembly elections of 2016 and 2017. This is because the 2016 
election suggested a waning attachment to nationalistic ideals, and 
greater contentment with the status quo. Such contentment though 
depended upon an advancement of the equality agenda, and 
growing parity of esteem for both cultures. When that failed to 
materialise in the infancy of the new Assembly, nationalists found 
themselves playing the part of “vanquished” national community 
in a non-inclusive political culture (O’Neill, 2003, p. 382). That, as 
warning signs in the survey suggested, would inevitably produce a 
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surge of radicalisation and a return to long-held cultural ideals, as 
came to happen in the election results of the 2017 Assembly.  
Despite this surge of nationalist sentiment and changing 
demographics (Nolan, 2012; Hughes, 2013), there still appears to 
be a foundation of hope for Northern Ireland’s immediate future. 
This survey has shown that many nationalists are prepared to put 
the desire for a united Ireland to one side if they can be equal 
partners and citizens within the constitutional status quo. 
Unfortunately, the survey also revealed considerable lack of trust 
regarding the Unionist parties’ ability to create such a state, and 
suggests a further failing on the part of the 1998 Agreement. 
Essentially, since this agreement was predicated upon a need to 
“minimize political violence” and “to prioritize the politics of 
national conflict over other struggles” (O’Neill, 2003, p. 387), it 
lacks the mechanisms to push dialogue beyond a state of endless 
“problematisation” (Vaughan-Williams, 2006). The fact of that is 
clear from events in the lifetime of the Assembly that constantly 
seems to break down on issues relating to symbols, culture, justice, 
language, and the elusive, hard-to-define ‘parity of esteem.’  
Unless nationalists feel that they are equal citizens, and that 
symbols of the state reflect their identity, this society is always 
going to be held prisoner not just to the past, but to the 
contingency of elections and demographics. Victory by numbers, as 
proven in Northern Ireland’s past, offers no hope for the future. 
Unfortunately, by its necessary ambiguity (Ruane and Todd, 2001, 
p. 923), the Belfast Agreement encourages this in some ways, and 
thus still “leaves much work to be done in institutionalising the 
rights that could secure equal citizenship status for all” almost 
seventeen years since O’Neill (2000, p. 42) first suggested this. For 
this to happen, unionists need to trust more in the strength of 
equality as a tool for guaranteeing nationalist contentment with 
the status quo. Of course, unionist trust is always going to be hard 
to attain when between 50-60% of nationalists, as seen in Figures 
One and Two, still aspire to a united Ireland in some form.  
Such an aspiration for a united Ireland does not have to be 
seen as an existential threat to present arrangements, as supported 
by qualitative analysis of responses within this study. Even those 
who seek eventual unification of the island have no desire to create 
a fresh conflict, with unionists as the angry, vanquished minority. 
That is explicitly stated several times by respondents, and could be 
interpreted as a sign that even though nationalists are not 100% 
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happy with the constitutional status quo, they are content with 
conditions of relative peace, and contemporary social normality.  
Nobody voiced a desire to return to armed struggle, or 
criticised the fundamentals of the Belfast Agreement (1998), even 
though ambiguity seems to exist with regard to its long-term 
purpose. Perhaps a solution then, in the short term, might be for 
all sides to sit down and talk again about what this framework 
actually means to them, particularly in creating parity of esteem. In 
doing so, contemporary Irish nationalism might also have to 
confront some of its own ambiguities particularly that seen herein 
of being happy as equal citizens within Northern Ireland, but also 
keeping alive the dream of Irish unity at some point in the future. 
The consensus though, on the basis of these responses, appears to 
be that a stable Northern Ireland is a much better prospect for 
nationalists right now because in the voice of one respondent “we 
have not dealt with past hurts on all sides.” Almost twenty years 
after the Belfast Agreement nationalists are caught in a half-way 
house synthesised in respondents’ words as “feeling culturally and 
historically Irish” but needing to facilitate a “more mature kind of 
politics in the North” before there can be talk of permanence, in 
whatever constitutional form that eventually comes in. Whatever 
that is though, there has to be a consensus on its implementation.    
On a final note, it is undeniable that Brexit has played a 
major role in “rehabilitating the concept of Irish unity” (Meagher, 
2016a). Due to the fact that the political landscape of Ireland, 
north and south, has been changed so radically in such a short 
period of time, this research study might have its greatest value in 
being seen as a pilot study for tracking further changes in 
nationalist perspectives since early 2016. Most commentators still 
appear to believe that the UK Referendum result has produced no 
significant change in the demand for immediate Irish unity, 
though the Lucid Talk Poll of May 2017 has suggested a surge of 
support for the notion of a border poll. There could of course be a 
myriad of reasons for that and evidence still suggests that 
Northern Irish nationalists continue to seek “normative 
expectations associated with equal citizenship” (McBride, 2015, p. 
249) rather than any desire of dragging unionists into a united 
Ireland against their will or “supplanting unionist identity as the 
dominant identity in Northern Ireland” (ibid, p. 256).  
Above all, there seems to be a growing recognition that 
demographics alone offers no solution to a situation that remains 
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complicated even two decades after the signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement. Solutions lie in mutual respect that not only entails 
unionists respecting nationalists, but also nationalism seeking 
“genuine compromise with unionists, loyalists, and the broader 
Protestant population” (Hopkins, 2015, p. 1). In doing this, 
nationalists are also moving beyond what could be seen as purely 
“a resigned acceptance of difference for the sake of peace” (Walzer, 
1997, p. 10). By reaching a point of accepting the validity of the 
opposing position and showing “enthusiastic endorsement of 
difference” (ibid), they may also paradoxically push forward their 
arguments for Irish unity by showing unionists they have nothing 
to fear in such a scenario, either culturally, economically, or 
militarily.       
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